Contrary to the Russian government and media, the Russia-Ukraine armed conflict is clearly classified as a war since the number of combat casualties far exceeds the 1,000 casualties threshold, which is typically used by scholars to define a war.
Estimates of casualties during first 6 months of the war by the author are based on officially admitted own casualties by Ukraine and separatists and individual count of casualties in Russia.
Ukrainian combat casualties are estimated at circa 15-20 thousand killed, based on the Arestovich (Zelenskyy presidential office adviser) admission on June 11 of circa 10 thousand military members killed (Focus, 2022), plus likely excluded estimated 1-2 thousand police, border guards, National Guard, foreign volunteers, etc. casualties, estimated 4 to 7 thousand killed since, based on official admissions of daily casualty rates, and rough estimate of MIA, who were killed.
Russian combat casualties range between 6 and 12 thousand killed, based on BBC Russian (2022) count of 5,701 individual Russian military, National Guard, FSB, etc. members identified as killed during the Russia-Ukraine️ war, plus estimates of killed Wagner group mercenaries and killed MIA & adjusted based on the BBC estimate that these casualties might be half of all casualties.
Total combat casualties of Donbas separatists are circa 5 thousand. The ombudsperson of the separatist DNR reports 2,780 killed DNR military, police, etc. members. Based on their population, such number corresponds to 1,700 killed in the separatist LNR. Plus killed MIA.
The officially admitted own casualties provide the minimal confirmed casualties. The Russian, Ukrainian, and Western governments inflated the military casualties of their adversary. Various supposedly leaked military casualties have all features of fakes because they were inflated and lacked validity and reliability.
The war combines elements of interstate war between Russia and Ukraine, a proxy war between the West and Russia, and a civil war in Ukraine. Interstate war between Russia and Ukraine and the proxy war between the West/NATO and Russia since the Russian invasion in 2022 are more dominant than a civil war, which continues since 2014. Russian forces strengths and casualties in Ukraine exceed separatist force strengths and casualties and the war territory far exceeds Donbas.
Russian invasion of Ukraine is illegal under international law. Contrary to the Russian government claim, this war cannot be classified as a preventive war under the international law because there were no imminent security threats. While the Ukrainian government proclaimed plans to join NATO and NATO publicly stated during the Bucharest summit and before the war that Ukraine would become NATO member in the future, there was no immediate likelihood of NATO membership of Ukraine or deployment of long-range missiles or nuclear weapons by NATO there.
While Zelenskyy reversed his election promises of peaceful resolution of the Donbas conflict, did not fulfill the Minsk agreements, and proclaimed intention to return separatist-controlled Donbas under the control of the central government, there was no confirmed evidence of imminent attack of Ukrainian forces to take back separatist-controlled Donbas. While Zelenskyy suggested during the Munich conference shortly before the Russian invasion that Ukraine might seek to become a nuclear power, there was no immediate prospect of Ukraine building nuclear or biological weapons. Russia inflated the imminent nature of such security threats to justify the illegal invasion of Ukraine.
The apparent initial goal of the Russian invasion was the regime change in Ukraine or to force the Ukrainian government to accept a peace deal with Russian demands of neutrality, demilitarization, “denazification” and recognition of separatist republics in Donbas in borders of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions. The Russian initial advance close to Kyiv without sufficient military force to capture it Negotiations with the Zelenskyy government that started within days after the invasion are consistent with such goal. .
Putin’s Victory Day speech and various subsequent statements by other Russian and separatist officials and Russian-appointed officials in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, in particular, about plans to organize in the occupied regions and separatist republics referendums on joining Russia suggest Russian plans to annex these regions in Southern and Eastern Ukraine. A KMIS survey that was commissioned by the author in Spring 2014 shows marginal support for joining Russia in Kherson & Zaporizhzhia regions and other regions of Southern & Eastern Ukraine, with the exceptions of Crimea and Donbas. (Katchanovski, 2014, 2016a).
The analysis of various evidence and the size and deployment of the Russian forces in Ukraine suggest that Russian plans did not envision the invasion and occupation or annexation of entire Ukraine, in particular Western Ukraine.
The war could had been avoided by Russia by not launching the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022. The war could had been prevented by the Ukrainian government and the US, NATO & EU, for instance, by providing implementation of the Minsk agreements and neutrality and EU membership of Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine is also a proxy war between the US/NATO and Russia. Ukraine fits definitions of a US client state. The US and NATO use Ukraine, in particular, the Ukrainian government and the forces, as a proxy. Various senior US officials and politicians admitted the proxy war. For example, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that “we want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine.” The proxy war in Ukraine, like other proxy wars, such as the wars in Vietnam and Angola, prolong the war.
Various evidence of US and UK direct involvement in planning, training, intelligence gathering, arming, and financing of the Ukrainian forces, in particular, for the Kherson and Kharkiv counter-offensives, is consistent with the proxy war. The Ukrainian forces and the government became largely depended during the war on supplies of weapons and financial aid by the US and other NATO members and the EU.
There are reports of presence of US and British special focres in Ukraine during the war, but no evidence of the direct involvement in the combat.
Ukrainian officials close to Zelenskyy revealed that the British prime minister visited Kyiv in April 2022 to block a peace deal with Russia after the Ukrainian government delegation in peace talks with Russia in its written peace plan proposal reportedly agreed to neutrality of Ukraine, no bases and troops from foreign countries, and no nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. (Ukrainska, 2022). Fiona Hill and Angela Stent confirmed citing “multiple former senior U.S. officials" that Russia & Ukraine agreed in April on a peace deal outline. (Hill and Stent, 2022).
Zelenskyy abandoned the negotiations right after this visit by the British prime-minister and not after the revelations of the Russian war crimes in Bucha. He stated after visiting Bucha his willingness to continue the negotiations (Strana, 2022). But after the Johnson’s visit, Zelenskyy and other senior government officials of Ukraine rejected peace talks. Zelenskyy and the Defense Minister of Ukraine stated that the war would only end with taking back all lost territory of Ukraine, i.e., not only territories occupied during the Russian invasion but also separatist-controlled Donbas and Russian annexed Crimea, and that such outcome would constitute the Ukrainian victory. Such radical policy shift happened even though the odds of such outcome remained extremely small because of the Russian military advantage over Ukraine.
The analysis shows no evidence of Ukrainian genocide in separatist-controlled Donbas and Russian genocide in Ukraine, but evidence of war crimes, in particular killings of Ukrainian civilians in Bucha by the Russian forces. The UN and the US intelligence also did not find evidence of the genocide in Ukraine corroborating the analysis of this study (NBC, 2022, Reuters, 2022). Genocide is commonly defined in political science and conflict studies as mass murder and other similar acts committed with the intent to destroy in whole or in part an ethnic, racial, religious, or social group. A similar definition was adopted by the UN Genocide Convention.
However, there is various evidence of war crimes by individual soldiers, commanders, or units. False genocide claims were used by Putin to justify the invasion of Ukraine, which resulted in many more civilian casualties than the war in Donbas prior to the invasion. False claims of genocide and inflated Russian war crimes in Bucha were also used by the Zelenskyy government and the US and some other Western governments to justify ending the peace talks to stop the war. There have been many more additional civilian casualties as a result of the ongoing war versus a possible peace deal that was close to agreement by the beginning of April. 2022.
Estimated 4-5 thousand civilians were killed in separatist-controlled Donbas during the civil war since 2014 and for the first 6 months of the Ukraine-Russia war. These estimates are based on the UN confirmed civilian casualties of the Donbas war in 2014-21 of at least 3.404 and at least 302 in separatist-controlled Donbas for the first 6 months of the Ukraine-Russia war plus estimated casualties in Russian-occupied regions of Ukraine and unaccounted casualties. (UN, 2022a, OHCHR. 2022a).
Estimated 8-10 thousand civilians were killed in Ukraine during first 6 months of the Ukraine-Russia war. This estimate is based on the UN confirmed 5,285 casualties on the Ukrainian government-controlled territory plus unaccounted casualties in Mariupol and other cities in Donbas and other regions. (UN, 2022a, 2022b).
About 3 thousand numbered graves filmed in Mariupol are primarily civilian residents killed during the Russia-Ukraine war.
Civilian casualties were often inflated or misrepresented. For instance, the claim that more than 100,000 Mariupol residents were killed is implausible since it implies that all city residents were killed or wounded, based on typical ratio of 1 killed to 3-4 wounded during the modern wars.
The UN reported in the beginning of June 2002 that 86% of 4,183 confirmed killed civilians in Ukraine were killed by shells, bombs, missiles, mines, and explosives, while 11.2% (468) were killed by other weapons, i.e, generally by bullets. (UN, 2022b). The UN reports documented no civilians killed by bullets in June-August.
The analysis of various videos, photos, media and social media reports, and the UN reports shows that the absolute majority of civilians casualties were in the Ukrainian government-controlled territory and inflicted by the Russian and separatist forces. For instance, the UN documented during the first six months of the war 3,015 civilians killed in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions on the Ukrainian government-controlled territory and 2,270 civilians killed in other regions of Ukraine which were under the Ukrainian government control when casualties occurred. The UN report documented 302 killed civilians in separatist and Russian-controlled Donbas. (See OHCHR, 2022a).
Various evidence, such as thousands of videos, media and social media reports, along with findings of UN and Amnesty International reports and US intelligence and military experts, shows that the overwhelming majority of civilians in the Ukrainian-controlled territories and in separatist-controlled Donbas were killed by explosive weapons with wide area effect or not-precise weapons during, respectively, Russian and too a much lesser extent Ukrainian military strikes. Civilians were killed during apparent indiscriminate shelling/bombing, overwhelmingly by the Russian forces, in populated urban and rural settlements. Videos, photos, and Amnesty International report show that populated civilian areas and facilities, such as cities, towns, villages, apartment buildings, schools, universities, hospitals, hotels, etc. were often used for military purposes, primarily by the Ukrainian forces for defense.
For example, such Russian shelling/bombing and missile strikes resulted in large numbers of Ukrainian civilian casualties in Mariupol, Vinnytsia, Kremenchuk, Chernihiv, Chasiv Yar, Izium, Chaplino, Bilohorivka, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv, and other locations in Ukraine. Both civilian and military casualties of the Russian missile strikes in Vinnytsia, Chasiv Yar, Chaplino, and Bilohorivka were identified by various Ukrainian media.
These findings are corroborated by assessments made by US military and intelligence experts, a Newsweek investigation, which was partly based on the US intelligence, of Russian missile strikes with the largest number of reported civilian casualties, and by the Amnesty International report. (Amnesty, 2022a, Newsweek, 2022a, 2022b).
For example, the analysis of various videos, eyewitness testimonies, and experts used in Amnesty International reports suggest that explosions in Mariupol maternity hospital and the Mariupol theater were likely from large Russian unguided avia bombs, which lack precision and can strike far from targets.There is similar evidence of large Russian unguided avia bombs killing several dozens residents in an apartment building in Izium and in a street queue in Chernihiv. Such bombings by inaccurate aviation bombs with wide impact area in populated areas during combat fit definitions of indiscriminate attacks in the international humanitarian law.
Contrary to claims by the Russian Defense Ministry and Donbas separatists, there is no confirmed evidence of false flag bombings of the Mariupol maternity hospital and the Mariupol theater by the Azov Regiment or other Ukrainian forces. Contrary to the claims by the Ukrainian government officials and the Ukrainian and Western media, there is no corroborating evidence of several hundred casualties of the Mariupol theater bombing.
The evidence concerning the Tochka-U missile strike that killed 60 civilians in the Kramatorsk train station is contradictory.
Similarly, the analysis of videos and testimonies suggests that a shot-down Ukrainian Tochka-U missile, which killed about two dozen civilians in Donetsk, apparently aimed at the nearby separatist DNR government headquarters.
There is no corroborated evidence of systematic false-flag shelling/bombing of civilians by the Russian, separatist, and Ukrainian forces. This concerns, for example, claims by the Russian and separatist governments that the bombing of the maternity hospital and a theater in Mariupol were false flag attacks and claims by the Ukrainian government that the shelling of Donetsk and the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant were false flags. But there is clear evidence of Russian missile strikes of power plants in Ukrainian government-controlled regions in September 2022.
Contrary to the Russian government claims of staged killings in Bucha, analysis of UN and Amnesty International reports, forensic expert reports, videos, satellite images, eyewitness reports, media investigative reports, and other sources confirms that the total of about several dozen civilians and territorial defense members were shot or summarily executed by individual Russian soldiers or Russian units during the Russian occupation of Bucha. Such summary executions are classified as war crimes.
The UN human rights mission report documented in Bucha “unlawful killing, including by summary execution, of some 50 civilians.” (OHCHR, 2022b). The Amnesty International report identified 22 Bucha residents killed by Russian forces. (Amnesty, 2022b). Videos, satellite images, and eyewitness testimonies confirm shooting or summary executions of different civilian residents and at least 8 unarmed territorial defense members in Bucha by the Russian forces (BBC, 2022, NYT, 2022).
Contrary to the claims by the Ukrainian and Western governments and the media, there is no documented evidence of Srebrenica-like mass execution (massacre) of a large proportion of the Bucha town residents by the Russian forces. The total 458 victims identified in Bucha after the Russian forces withdrawal included some non-civilians, and 39 who “appeared to have died of natural causes.” (Washington Post, 2022). Forensic experts confirmed that many victims were shot in the head or by automatic gunfire, but did not reveal their specific number. (Guardian, 2022). The other victims or the absolute majority of them were likely killed by shelling since videos, photos and eyewitnesses showed shelling in Bucha by Russian and Ukrainian forces during fighting for control of this town. For example, forensic experts revealed that dozens of Bucha residents were “killed by tiny metal arrows from shells” (flechettes) (Guardian, 2022).
The war in Ukraine also has elements of the civil war which began in Donbas in 2014. But in contrast to the brief Russian military interventions in Donbas in support of pro-Russian separatist in August 2014 and January-February 2015, the Russian forces and casualties in 2022 far outnumbered those of the Donbas separatist forces, and the Russian invasion involved not only Donbas but also other regions in the Eastern, Southern, and Central Ukraine. The Russian government recognized separatist republics as independent states a few days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. But they de facto remained client states of Russia. For instance, Russian officials were appointed to the top positions in the DNR and LNR governments, and the separatist forces under de facto Russian command were deployed beyond Donbas to the Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, and Kharkiv Regions.
Contrary to the Russian government and media claims used to justify the Russian invasion, the Ukrainian government and the military are not Nazi or neo-Nazi. There is not a single neo-Nazi in the Ukrainian government or the Ukrainian parliament. Neo-Nazis constituted about 1% of the Ukrainian forces during the war. However, contrary to the Ukrainian and Western governments and media claims, the far-right, including neo-Nazis, in particular in the neo-Nazi-led Azov regiment and other neo-Nazi-led formations and members of neo-Nazi organizations, are integrated in the National Guard, the police, and the Security Service of Ukraine. They have outsize power relative to their numbers. (See Katchanovski, 2017). In particular, the neo-Nazi founder and the first commander of the Azov battalion threated Zelenskyy against making a peace deal at the beginning of the war. The neo-Nazi-led Azov regiment played a leading role in the Mariupol battle in Spring 2022, but its members surrendered to the Russian and separatist forces after the siege of Azovstal steel plant.
There are videos and eyewitness testimonies suggesting that Azov regiment members killed a certain number of Mariupol residents during the battle for Mariupol and used aoartment buildings, schools, and other civilian facilities during the fighting with the Russian and separatist forces. Videos and eyewitness testimonies reveal executions of Russian POWs by the Georgian Legion and by the neo-Nazi-led Kraken unit, which was formed by the civilian wing of the neo-Nazi-led Azov regiment. Such killings are classified as war crimes. (See, for example, BBC, 2022).
Contrary to the Western and Ukrainian governments and media narratives, Ukraine is not a democracy but is largely undemocratic (See Katchanovski, 2017). After a brief period of relative democratization and semi-democracy following a victory of Zelenskyy in the presidential elections, he moved to institute a largely authoritarian rule, for instance by blocking the Constitutional Court of Ukraine and by imposing sanctions against some opposition leaders on treason charges that appeared trumped-up. Zelenskyy used the Russian invasion and the war as a pretext to eliminate most of the political opposition and potential rivals for power and to consolidate his largely undemocratic rule in Ukraine. Sixteen opposition parties that were banned by a court in Lviv in Western Ukraine after hasty proceedings and without any lawyers present include several left parties. They were banned even though these parties condemned the Russian invasion or did not endorse it. Six leaders of major Ukrainian political parties are charged with state treason or are reportedly investigated on state treason charges that appear to be trumped up. Opinion polls show that half of voters in Ukraine before the Ukraine-Russia war expressed intention to vote for the political parties, whose leaders are charged with or are reportedly investigated for state treason. This was three times more than for the Zelenskyy’s ruling party. (KIIS, 2022). The Zelenskyy government also closed four opposition TV news channels and after the start of the Russian invasion required all remaining TV news channels to broadcast the single television news marathon program.